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INSTALL MCAFEE NITRO IN VMWARE ESXI 5 IN SIMPLE STEPS HOW TO
INSTALL MCAFEE NITRO IN VMWARE ESXI 5 IN SIMPLE STEPS CODE

Prohibit execution of custom code inside ESXi ( )Īs always, make sure you test and evaluate the consequence of any upgrades and changes on a non-critical part of your environment before rolling it out in production.

(Optional) Enable UEFI Secure Boot on the physical servers.

To prevent the actual ransomware execution, we recommend our customers to take the following steps for all ESXi hosts: Three steps to protect ESXi against ransomware

Make frequent backups, and make sure they can not be deleted even if the attacker gets complete control over the rest of your environment.

Configure central logging so that you have tamper-proof logs of all administrative actions and changes in your environment.

Use dedicated workstations and MFA for administrators.

Segment your networks so that vCenter Server and ESXi administrative interfaces are not reachable for non-administrative computers and users.

Consider not using Active Directory for administrator level access to vSphere.

Use unique, strong passwords for administrative accounts and handle them securely.

Keep your systems (vCenter Server, ESXi hosts, VMware Tools etc.) up to date when there are security patches released.

When we at Truesec perform Security Health Checks of customers' vSphere environments, we always give everyone the following fundamental recommendations, so do make sure you also work towards getting these under control:

They also have some good videos covering the basics of ransomware protection on vSphere (but doesn't mention execInstalledOnly):

INSTALL MCAFEE NITRO IN VMWARE ESXI 5 IN SIMPLE STEPS HOW TO

VMware has a good technical post about this ransomware at Deconstructing Defray777 Ransomware, which goes through the technical details, but doesn't mention specifically how to protect the ESXi hosts. Reverse engineering of the RansomEXX/Defray777 ESXi ransomware, displaying the strings found.

As long as the host is still running, the ransomware monitors the virtual machines and will encrypt any new vmdk or other virtual machine files that are put on shared datastores that it can reach. However, they will usually not survive a reboot, and will need a complete reinstallation. It will also encrypt the ESXi host itself including all log files, so unless you have central tamper-proof logging in place it will be very difficult to secure forensic evidence regarding how the attack was carried out.ĭespite the encryption, the ESXi hosts will usually remain running since they have already loaded the system files into memory. The ransomware will encrypt all virtual machines' vmdk files on all attached datastores. Screenshot of ESXi virtual machine files encrypted by RansomEXX/Defray777 A future blog post will analyze this in more detail and provide more suggested protections. This could for example be done through an RCE vulnerability such as the one for SLP in ESXi or through Active Directory->vCenter Server->ESXi, but also in other ways. This blog post won't go into the technical details on how the attacker gets into the ESXi hosts to execute the actual ransomware. This can greatly increase the scope and speed of the attack, which is bad news for us. The benefit of this method from the attackers' side is that they can encrypt numerous systems without having to reach them all over the network and obtain administrative privileges.

We have recently seen an increase in ransomware attacks where the encryption is executed from the virtualization platform (ESXi or Hyper-V hosts) rather than from inside each guest operating systems (Windows, Linux etc).

We can fairly easily prevent this by using the relatively unknown ESXi setting (optionally in combination with TPM 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot) which is described in the 'Three steps to protect ESXi against ransomware' section below.

This attack vector is possible because once attackers get control of an ESXi host, they are by default allowed to upload and execute any custom binaries they want.

More info on it can be found in this Crowdstrike writeup.

Ransomware executing inside a VMware vSphere ESXi host can encrypt all the virtual machines at once, without having to compromise each guest operating system.

Why we should use execInstalledOnly to protect ESXi against ransomware